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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EMERGENCE OF THE WAGE
EARNER'S PLAN
"The purpose of bankruptcy from the point of view of the
man deeply in debt, is relief."' This statement is especially true in
proceedings under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.2 One of
the primary reasons for bankruptcy legislation is the relief of the
poor but honest debtor who finds himself in financial difficulty. In
ordinary bankruptcy,' the debtor surrenders his interest in all non-
exempt property and is granted a discharge. 4 Generally he is allowed
to retain his future acquisitions and earnings, with no legal obli-
gation to use his newly gained wealth for the payment of his
discharged debts.5 On the other hand, when a wage earner files a
petition under the provisions of Chapter XIII, he promises his
future earnings to the payment of his existing debts. The wage
earner's plan, as it is called, requires an extended period of
belt-tightening. To the debtor who has the alternative of obtaining
a discharge, through a straight bankruptcy, the decision to pledge
his future must be difficult indeed.'
It has often been said that there is a stigma attached to an
ordinary bankruptcy. The petitioner is called a "bankrupt." This
term connotes to some the idea of a deadbeat, one who will not pay
what he owes. The Act provides another method, the wage earner's
plan, whereby the debtor may resolve his financial dilemma. Under
such a plan he is called a "debtor" rather than a "bankrupt," and
this is regarded by some as an attractive feature of Chapter XIII.
1 COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1963).
2 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1086. It is beyond the scope of this comment to examine
all the provisions and intricacies of Chapter XIII. A good introduction to the subject
is found in COWANS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 83-95. For an exhaustive treatment see
10 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 531 et seq. (14th ed. 1963); 9 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
§ 3747 et seq. (6th ed. 1955). Also, for the procedure involved see Gates, My Practice
in Chapter 13 Proceedings, 17 REP. J. 95 (1943).
3 Chapters I through VII of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-112.
4 Of course there are conditions and exceptions to the granting of discharges. A
discussion of these is beyond the scope of this comment.
5 Section 70a, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110, provides generally that the trustee is vested with
the bankrupt's title in any non-exempt property that the bankrupt could have trans-
ferred or which was subject to levy. But Congress did provide that future interests
and inheritances which became vested within six months of the bankrupt's adjudication
are drawn into the bankruptcy estate.
6 For a practical discussion of what type of persons is a good prospect for Chap-
ter XIII, see CowANs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85.
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But as has been pointed out: "No stigma need attach to an honest
bankruptcy, and it is doubtful how much less stigma applies to a
proceeding in the bankruptcy court where the petitioner is labeled
a debtor and not a bankrupt."
7
The wage earner's plan, as it now exists, was introduced into
the Act by the Chandler Amendment in 1938. For fifteen years
the provisions introduced by the amendment lay dormant, used
mainly in Alabama and Kansas. Decisions from the courts were
sparse.' Only 8,670 petitions were filed in 1953.1 In 1960 there
were 13,599.10 In 1961 the figure reached 19,723,11 and in 1962, it
rose to 22,880.12
With this expanded use of Chapter XIII cases have begun to
appear more frequently in the reports. This article will discuss
some recent cases and weigh them in light of statutory and policy
considerations.
CONTENTS OF A PLAN
What can be included in a wage earner's plan is governed by
the general language found in section 646."3 Three mandatory
provisions and four permissive ones are found in that section. The
plan must treat all unsecured debts generally, that is, alike and
without discrimination. The debtor must also provide in his plan
for submission of his future wages to the jurisdiction of the court.
He must also insert a provision stating that the court has the power
to modify the plan from time to time. In addition, the plan may
deal with secured debts, provide for priority between secured and
unsecured debts, provide for rejection of executory contracts by
the trustee, and include other provisions harmonious with Chapter
XIII.14
7 MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 374 (1956). Professor MacLachlan's reference to
"debtor" was in the context of a discussion of Chapter XIII. The term "bankrupt"
refers to one who has been adjudicated in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1(4). In Chapter XIII, section 606 reads in part: ". . . (3) 'debtor' shall
mean a wage earner who filed a petition under this chapter . 1." I1 U.S.C.A. §
1006(3).
8 Ibid. In fact the author said: "The affairs of such wage earners have not pro-
duced any considerable body of case law." Professor MacLachlan doubted whether
Chapter XIII had much utility at all.
9 1953 DIRECTOR ADnnN. Op. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 196-198.
10 1961 D RCTOR ADmN. OFF. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 213.
11 Ibid.
12 1962 DIRECTOR ADmiN. OFF. U.S. COURTs ANN. REP. 67. The impetus to the
increases noted occurred in 1959 when the $5,000.00 limit on earnings was removed,
so that all who receive their principal income from wages are now eligible to file
Chapter XIII petitions.
1 11 U.S.C.A. § 646.
14 See generally NADLER, TnE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF 531-40 (1954).
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NECESSITY OF FILING PROOF OF CLAIM
Writers have divided on whether creditors need file proof of
claims in order to participate in a distribution under the plan. 15
Under the old section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, which governed
compositions, creditors whose claims were scheduled by the bankrupt
but were never proved could nevertheless join in the distribution.
In re Heger"6 held that only creditors who filed proofs of
claim were entitled to dividends. The court decided that section
57n I" applied in Chapter XIII proceedings. That section denies
participation to creditors who do not file claims within six months
of the first meeting of creditors. In re Maye's also applied section
57n to a wage earner's proceeding in deciding a different question.
The court said that neither the debtor nor the referee could require
as a condition precedent to a creditor's participation that he file
within a period shorter than the six months allowed by 57n.
THE COURT'S POWER OVER SECURED CREDITORS
Creditors whose claims are secured by estates in real property
or chattels real cannot be included in a wage earner's plan.'9 Several
cases have discussed whether they can nevertheless be restrained
by the court from enforcing their security. In re Garrett" upheld
an order restraining a mortgagee from foreclosing where the
mortgagor had an equity in the realty. The court said that under
15 See the authorities cited in In re Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147, 148 (D. Minn. 1959).
16 180 F. Supp. 147 (D. Minn. 1959).
17 11 U.S.C.A. § 93(n).
18 180 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1958).
19 In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459 (D. Ala. 1962). Section 606, 11 U.S.C.A. §
1006, excludes from the phrase "claims" claims secured by estates in real property.
Further, a creditor is defined as a holder of a claim. From these two definitions the
court concluded that it was the intent of Congress to exclude from Chapter XIII
plans a creditor fully secured in realty. Id. at 460.
Section 646, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1046, reads: "A plan under this chapter . . . (2) may
deal with secured debts severally. . . ." Thus section 646 by its terms seems to ex-
clude creditors secured by estates in real property. But the definitions laid down in
section 606 are to be applicable "unless inconsistent with the context" of the re-
mainder of the chapter. The court did not consider whether the context of section
646 was inconsistent with the definitions of "claims," "creditors," or "debts" given
by section 606. Nor does Collier discuss any possible conflict. 10 COLLER, Op. cit.
supra note 2, at 654.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed all the above reasoning as a technicality when it
said in a footnote to Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 569
(1963): "This would seem to be a purely technical point, it making no substantial
difference whether the payments are made to the creditor by the trustee under the
plan or directly to the creditor by the debtor. . ....
20 203 F. Supp. 459 (D. Ala. 1962).
WAGE EARNER'S PLAN
section 61121 the bankruptcy court had the jurisdiction to deal with
all of the debtor's property.
However, the district judge in In re Hallenbeck22 saw things
differently. In fact he was doubly sure because he had to decide
the same case twice. Mr. and Mrs. Hallenbeck had an equity of
$500 in a lot held by the entireties. The defendant insurance com-
pany held a note secured by a deed of trust on the lot. The husband,
three months delinquent in his payments, filed a wage earner's
petition which was confirmed. In the plan he proposed to have the
trustee apply all proceeds to the payment of the secured debt, until
the arrearage was cleared. However, the defendant exercised its
option under an acceleration clause, declared the remaining balance
of the note due, and proposed to foreclose when the debtor did not
satisfy the entire sum. The referee enjoined the insurance company
from foreclosing.
The district court held that since the lot was held by the en-
tireties, the bankruptcy court had no power to deal with it. By way
of dictum the court also based its holding on a view opposite the
one taken by Garrett. Subsequent to this decision Mrs. Hallenbeck
also filed, and her petition was properly joined with her husband's.
Now the court had to decide precisely the same issue which faced
the court in Garrett. It based its holding on section 606,28 which
explicitly excludes from the definition of a claim one which is secured
by an estate in real property. Since Congress excluded this class of
creditors from Chapter XIII, the court reasoned, it must have in-
tended to put the class outside the reach of the bankruptcy court
altogether. The Garrett court had taken a different approach. Section
611 gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's property
during the period of the plan, without any limitation. Section 61424
confers the power to enjoin or stay until final decree any pro-
ceeding to enforce a lien upon the debtor's property. The court
referred to cases under Chapter XI where secured creditors have
been enjoined, even though no secured creditor may be dealt with
under that chapter.25 The court wished to prevent the dissipation
of the debtor's equity in the property because under section 66626
21 11 U.S.C.A. § 1011.
22 209 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. Va. 1962); reheard subsequently 211 F. Supp. 604
(W.D. Va. 1962).
23 11 U.S.C.A. § 1006. "... (1) 'claims' shall include all claims of whatever
character . . . but shall not include claims secured by estates in real property or
chattels real. .. ."
24 11 U.S.C.A. § 1014.
25 For a detailed discussion of the injunctive power under Chapter XI, see 8
COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 253-82.
26 11 U.S.C.A. § 1066.
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Chapter XII proceedings may be dismissed and the debtor ad-
judicated a bankrupt.
The Garrett view was to prevail. In Hallenbeck v. Penn
Mutual" the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. In approv-
ing the reasoning of the Garrett decision, the appellate court stressed
the proper distinction between the creditor's inability to be included
in the plan and the court's injunctive power.28 The court stated that
the "general purpose of Chapter XIII is to afford a means of relief
and rehabilitation ... by providing a method for effecting a composi-
tion with creditors, or extension of time to pay debts, or both. '29
In the discretionary exercise of its injunctive power, the bankruptcy
court acts as a court of equity and has the requisite powers to
effectuate the primary purpose of Chapter XIII-the rehabilitation
of the wage earner.
These cases concerning claims secured by real property in-
terests can be compared to cases where the creditors had their
security in personal property. These latter cases are not easily
harmonized. Chapter XIII plans may include provisions for
creditors secured by chattels.80 Each secured creditor must be dealt
with on separate terms. The plan can include some secured creditors
and exclude others altogether, but no secured creditor can be
included unless he consents. Before the court can confirm the plan,
section 652"' requires that those secured creditors who are "dealt
with" must approve.
The more difficult question confronting the courts is: When
is a creditor "dealt with"? The plan in In re Clevenger3 provided
in part: ". . . secured debts held by creditors who accept the plan
shall have priority over the unsecured debts and shall be dealt with
separately .... ,,31 The secured creditors rejected the plan. The
trustee offered to assume the contract and its payment schedule.
The creditors were held not to have been dealt with and the trustee
was allowed to assume the contract. When the secured creditors
tried to reclaim their security, they were denied relief. The court
27 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
28 Id. at 569 where it was said: "Although Penn Mutual is not a 'creditor,'
cannot file a 'claim' against debtors, and therefore may not be required to participate
in the wage earner's plan, it does not follow as a matter of law, that the Referee
erred in enjoining foreclosure. Jurisdiction to issue such an injunction is grounded
independently and is not subject to the same restrictions as is the scope oj the wage
earner plan under Chapter XIII." (Emphasis added.)
29 Id. at 570.
80 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
81 11 U.S.C.A. § 1052.
82 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960).
88 Id. at 756.
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held its injunctive power extended to cover the situation. But in
In re O'Dell14 a chattel mortgagee rejected a provision in the
debtor's plan whereby the trustee was to pay a reduced amount on
the contract. The district court held that a plan which does not
provide for payment according to the terms of the contract deals
with secured claims. Unlike the Clevenger trustee, the O'Dell
trustee did not assume the contract. The real tenor of the court's
opinion is based upon the reasoning implicit in the following
quotation:
The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and his
property, wherever located, and of his earnings and wages during
the period of the consummation of the plan (§ 611) . . . Associates
(the creditor) cannot pursue the remedies available to it in the state
courts. It is subject to the provisions of § 614, authorizing the stay
until final decree of any suit to enforce its lien. Under these circum-
stances, it is unrealistic to say that its claim is not "dealt with by the
plan."8 5
Thus, even if the secured creditor is not mentioned by the plan, he
is still "dealt with" 'because he is brought under the injunctive power
of the bankruptcy court.
In a similar fact situation the same judge held that the creditor
was entitled either to his contract payments and assumption by the
trustee or the return of his security.86 In this case the secured
creditor did not resist confirmation of the plan. Rather the creditor
wanted return of his security, which was denied by the referee but
allowed by the district judge. In an earlier case, a reclamation
petition was denied an acquiescing creditor where the debtor had
a substantial equity in the chattel and the plan provided for full
payment.8
7
At this point it will be profitable to contrast the realty cases
with the personalty cases. In re Clevenger8 and Hallenbeck v.
Penn Mutual'9 are clearly in concert. Both cases involved an exer-
cise of the bankruptcy court's injunctive power in instances where
the creditors could not be included in the plan. The basic reasoning
behind these cases can be traced to decisions under Chapter XI.
In re O'Dell4 adds a concept repeated in In re Copes:4' a secured
84 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kansas 1962).
85 Id. at 391.
86 In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kansas 1962).
87 In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1940); the Duncan case is cited and
explained in In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kansas 1962) and in Hallenbeck v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
38 282 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1960).
89 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
40 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kansas 1962).
41 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kansas 1962).
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creditor is dealt with by a plan when he receives less than the full
contractual payment. Such a creditor cannot be forced into the
plan unless he accepts, nor may he be enjoined from foreclosing if
he chooses not to accept.
When will the courts allow the debtor an injunction against
the secured creditor who has not been or cannot be included in
the plan? The Penn Mutual case laid down a workable test con-
sisting of three elements :42
1. The injunction is necessary to carry out the plan or preserve
the estate;
2. The injunction will not impair the creditor's lien;
3. The debtor has made provision for the payment of the full
contractual periodic amounts.
These elements are in addition to the general equitable requirements
of good faith and an ability on the part of the debtor to carry out
the plan. Such injunctions, like any others, are in the sound dis-
cretion of the referee.
4 3
Although the cases agree on the above mentioned principle,
at one point the appellate court in Penn Mutual did not follow the
Copes and O'Dell cases to their logical conclusions. It was stated
in Copes: "I hold that a secured creditor who rejects a plan is en-
titled either to his contract benefits or the return of his security."
Certainly an acceleration clause is a "contract benefit."44 Then
why did the Penn Mutual court, which cited Copes approvingly, not
allow the creditor to declare the whole sum due and to reposses
his security? The reasons must be several. First, the court was
impressed with the rehabilitative purpose of Chapter XIII. To
allow the creditor to defeat a plan by invocation of an acceleration
clause would frustrate the objectives of the law. Second, the court
cited the Garrett case where the debtor was also in default. However,
no mention is made in that case of an acceleration clause. Third,
close comparisons to Chapter XI were drawn. Finally, the court
never squarely faced the issue. Consequently, there is still room
for dispute whether the court may deny the creditor his power of
acceleration.
The question of who is a secured creditor under section 65241
was before the court in Interstate Finance Corporation v.
42 Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
43 Id. at 572.
44 In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D. Kansas 1962).
45 11 U.S.C.A. § 1052.
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Scrogham.46 The debtor had listed the plaintiff as an unsecured
creditor. At the creditor's meeting Interstate's attorney stated that
the debt was in fact secured by a duly filed chattel morgage on the
debtor's automobile. The referee ruled that since Interstate had
not filed a proof of security, it was not to be considered a secured
creditor and did not have the veto power set forth in section 652.
The referee further ruled that the requisite majority of the un-
secured creditors had approved the plan. The district court refused
to set aside the confirmation. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that the creditor ". . . was not required to file a proof of claim in
order to protect its security."47
THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION
The Bankruptcy Act makes provision for both extension and
composition plans. 8 When either plan is successfully and fully
performed, a discharge is granted.49 But even the debtor who fails
to perform completely may obtain a discharge where the court in
its discretion finds the debtor's failure was due to circumstances for
which he could not justifiably be held accountable."'
Section 656a(3) 5 allows a plan to be confirmed if the wage
earner has not committed any act or omission which would bar his
discharge. Under section 14c(5)52 a discharge will be denied where
the debtor has been granted a discharge in bankruptcy or a confir-
mation of a wage earner's composition plan within six years of the
debtor's filing.
This combination of sections 656a(3) and 14c(5) gives rise
to a number of problems for debtors who have had bankruptcy
46 265 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1959).
47 Id. at 892. A vigorous dissent was registered by Judge Miller. "It is the
settled rule in the administration of a bankruptcy that a secured creditor, who has
the security in his possession, may rely upon his security and is not required to file
proof of his secured claim, but if the security is within the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court he must file a secured claim if he wishes to retain his secured status."
Id. at 893. The provisions of ordinary banruptcy are applicable in Chapter XIII un-
less inconsistent with the Chapter's provisions. Judge Miller argues that Chapter XIII
contains nothing which would make the rules requiring proof of claim inconsistent.
But the majority opinion construes section 652, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1052, to show Congress
intended that only the claims of unsecured creditors need be filed and proved in
order to qualify to vote. Secured creditors are placed under no such condition.
48 " '[Pilan' shall mean a plan for a composition or extension. . . ." 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1006(7). Judicial recognition of the distinction is found in In re Thompson, 51 F.
Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
49 11 U.S.C.A. § 1060.
50 11 U.S.C.A. § 1061.
51 11 U.S.C.A. § 1056a(3).
52 11 U.S.C.A. § 32c(5).
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proceedings and who have need of them within the following six
years.
In re Thompson 3 held that a prior extension plan under
Chapter XIII, where the debts were fully paid, was not a bar to a
subsequent bankruptcy within the six year period. The court so held
even though it realized that under section 6604 the debtor had been
granted a discharge upon full payment of his debts in the previous
extension. The case is sound on both statutory and policy grounds.
Section 14c(5) explicitly mentions that a prior Chapter XIII compo-
sition plan will bar a subsequent discharge. But no mention is made
of an extension. Section 14c(5) is designed to eliminate the habitual
bankrupt. A debtor who fully settles his debts should not be classed
with the habitual bankrupt. That Congress intended to allow a
bankruptcy after a successfully completed extension is implied by
its clear mention of composition in 14c(5) without any corre-
sponding expression on extensions.
Next In re Mahaley55 decided that a previous discharge in
voluntary bankruptcy would not bar a later confirmation of an
extension plan under Chapter XIII. The issue decided in this case
is extremely important. Many who have received discharges are in
finaAcial difficulty within six years. Whether or not they can protect
their possessions and pay off their debts through an extension of
time is vital.
The question posed in Mahaley has been bantered about by
the courts. In re Sharp56 squarely agrees with the view of Mahaley.
Also where the wage earner had a previous extension, he was allowed
another within six years. 57 But there is authority against Mahaley
53 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
54 11 U.S.C.A. § 1060.
55 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Calif. 1960). The same result was reached in In re
Autry, 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kansas, 1962).
56 205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
57 In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962). Mention must be made of a
case decided by the District Court of Kansas where both Holmes and Sharp were
decided. In re Bingham, 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kansas 1960), held that a previous
Chapter XIII proceeding barred confirmation of an extension plan. The case did not
disclose whether the prior plan was by way of extension or composition. Different
courts have interpreted the case differently. In re Autry, 204 F. Supp. 820(D. Kansas, 1962), thought the prior plan was a composition; In re Holmes, 309
F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962), considered it an extension; and the court in In re Sharp,
205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962), failed to consider the question. Bingham is doubt-
ful authority, since it was discussed disapprovingly by its own circuit court in Holmes.
The problem of a wage earner with prior bankruptcy history is discussed in the
following notes and comments: Confirmation of Extension Plan Within Six Years,
4 B.C. IND. AND COm. L. REV. 745 (1962); Effect of Discharge on Subsequent Chap-
ter XIII Proceedings, 47 IowA L. Rav. 155 (1961); Wage Earners' Plans-Chapter
X1I, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 582, 595 (1961); Wage Earner Plans and the Six-Year Rule,
15 STAN. L. Rav. 518 (1963).
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and Sharp, on the question whether a previous discharge through a
straight bankruptcy or composition plan will bar a subsequent
extension. In re Schlageter,58 a Third Circuit case, rejected the views
of the two district courts in Mahaley and Sharp and held that the
previous discharge was a bar even to an extension.
Mahaley determined that the purposes of section 14c(5) were
so inconsistent with subsequent Chapter XIII extension proceedings
that 14c(5) was inapplicable. Section 14c(5) seeks to prevent the
habitual bankrupt who will not pay his obligations. The primary
purpose of a Chapter XIII extension plan is to free the debtor
from attachments and garnishments so he can ultimately repay his
debts in full. But the Third Circuit in deciding Schlageter construed
the same sections of the Bankruptcy Act differently than did the
Mahaley court. The court upheld the referee's and district judge's
refusal to honor the debtor's petition for an extension plan. Prior
discharge after bankruptcy within six years of filing was a bar to
confirmation. The decision was grounded on the fear that the
debtor, while not fully completing the plan, would still receive a
discharge under section 66119 because of his good faith attempt to
complete. The judge in Mahaley answered this objection by saying
that under these circumstances a discharge could not be granted.
The key to the situation lies in the discretionary power of the court
under section 661. This section does not make the discharge
mandatory even though the debtor's failure to complete the plan
was justified. The court may or may not grant the discharge as it
sees fit.60
The Mahaley result is desirable because it allows a debtor
confirmation of an extension plan even though he has had a
discharge within six years. The fears voiced by the Schlageter
court seem well founded, until one looks at the discretionary power
vested in the court under section 661. The court should not exercise
its discretionary power to grant the discharge when a previously
discharged debtor fails to complete an extension. A decision on this
basis would have been better than the prohibitionary fiat laid down
by Schlageter.
There may have been deeper reasons for the divergence in the
above two decisions. The Mahaley case was heard in the District
Court for the Southern District of California where 1,053 cases
were commenced within the district during the 1962 fiscal year.
During the same period in the Third Circuit, where Schlageter was
58 319 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1963).
59 11 U.S.C.A. § 1061.
60 10 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 697.
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heard, only 187 were filed. The Tenth Circuit, where 1,859 petitions
were filed in 1962, handed down the Sharp decision which approved
Mahaley.6' It is submitted that those courts which are more familiar
with Chapter XIII proceedings will be more favorable to the debtors
who file them. These courts, especially in the referee's chambers
where the plans originate and are administered, are more cognizant
of the need for relief which faces debtors. To referees who have
handled a volume of Chapter XIII proceedings, it is reasonable to
allow the debtor an opportunity to file an extension. If the plan
is successful, the creditors will be satisfied. If unsuccessful, the
creditors may still pursue their remedies, since under the Mahaley
philosophy no discharge will be granted.
In summary the courts have held that a fully completed prior
extension under Chapter XIII is not a bar to either straight bank-
ruptcy or subsequent wage earner plans. But a discharge by way
of composition or bankruptcy proceeding will prevent future compo-
sitions or bankruptcies within six years. There is a split on whether
such discharges will bar confirmation of a Chapter XIII extension
plan. Mahaley and Sharp say the plan is available; Schlageter says
it is not. It is submitted that under such circumstances the debtor
should be allowed an extension, but not granted a discharge if he
fails to pay off his debt in full.
FROM DEBTOR TO BANKRUPT
The debtor files a Chapter XIII proceeding. A confirmation is
granted. This debtor then changes his mind because he finds the
financial burden too heavy; or his wife objects to their limited
budget; or there is some other reason which may be more or less
valid. Can a debtor, once his plan has been filed and approved,
change his mind and be adjudicated a bankrupt? Section 65762
makes such a plan binding on the creditors and on the debtor. Pro-
vision is made in section 66663 for dismissal of a case where the
debtor has defaulted, or the debtor under default may consent to
an adjudication. However, no statutory allowance is made for a
voluntary abandonment of a successful plan. The appellant trustee
in Rice v. Mimns64 claimed that if the debtor was not in default,
he could not file an ordinary petition. The district court had honored
the debtor's petition and adjudicated him a bankrupt. On appeal the
Tenth Circuit affirmed.
61 All the figures in the text were abstratced from Table F2 found in the
ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 12, at 260-62.
62 11 U.S.C.A. § 1057.
63 11 U.S.C.A. § 1066.
64 291 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961).
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The trustee argued that under section 657, the debtor was
bound by his plan. Further, section 66865 clearly states:
Except as provided in section 666 of this Act and elsewhere in this
chapter, a debtor shall not be adjudged a bankrupt either in a
proceeding under this chapter or in any proceeding instituted under
this Act, during the pendency of a proceeding under this chapter.
Since the debtor was not in default, he did not come under the
provisions of section 666. The only other sections of Chapter XIII
that dealt with releasing the debtor from his plan were sections 660
and 661, dealing with the discharge granted the debtor after satis-
factory completion or performance under the plan. These were not
applicable in the case.
But the court refused to place a narrow construction on the
statutory provisions. A wage earner's plan is purely voluntary. An
attempt to hold one against his will would be, for practical purposes,
impossible. The court said:
.. . the historical considerations of the difficulties of administration
of bankruptcy where the only "property" to be submitted to creditors'
demands is the wage earner's ability and willingness to produce earnings
from which his debts may be paid are inherent in the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act. A wage earner may only be adjudged a bankrupt
with his consent; he is not subject to involuntary proceedings.66
The court's opinion was contrary to the expressions of the text
writers." Although the statutory language was stretched, the deci-
sion is basically a good one from the viewpoint of debt administration
and debtor relief. The debtor could have defaulted, had the plan
dismissed, and then filed in bankruptcy. Since the Bankruptcy
Court has jurisdiction over the debtor's earnings during the course
of the plan, the most expedient way for the debtor to default under
the plan would be to quit or lose his job. Then the plan would be
dismissed and the debtor free to file an ordinary petition. But this
would be more harmful to creditors, to the debtor, and to society
in general than to allow the debtor to voluntarily file before a
default. Under Rice v. Mimms, then, a debtor may file for straight
bankruptcy even though he is not in default.
One further aspect of this problem should be mentioned. No
65 11 U.S.C.A. § 1068.
66 Rice v. Mimms, 291 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1961).
67 Both the standard texts, REMINGTON and COLLIER, had gauged incorrectly
the course that would be taken by the courts. "The language of § 668 would appear to
preclude the debtor from abandoning his plan on his own initiative while Chapter
XIII proceedings were pending, and going into voluntary bankruptcy, thus regaining
control of his subsequent earnings." 9 REmINGTON, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 3770.
See also 14 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 719.
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cases have discussed the possible res adjudicata effect of the Chapter
XIII confirmation on the debtor's discharge in ordinary
bankruptcy.68
CONCLUSION
The stepchild of bankruptcy has finally matured. The
emergence of the Chapter XIII wage earner plan from its infancy
has been swift. As noted previously, the number of cases have in-
creased rapidly. With this increase in Chapter XIII proceedings
has come complexity both in problems and administration.
The thinking toward wage earners' plans has evolved from
scepticism69 to enthusiasm. 70 The administration of the plan is now
the function of specialists. 71 Where the facilities for handling many
wage earner plans are centralized in one trustee, the resulting
economies are proving a boon to creditors and debtors alike.71
In the future the wage earner plan will become increasingly
popular. First, the plan allows the conscientous wage earner who
is in financial difficulty an honorable remedy.73 Second, the courts
recognize the desirability of the plan and will liberally construe the
provisions of Chapter XIII to benefit the debtor.74 Third, the public
will become aware of the advantages of a plan. Finally, and most
68 See COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 95 (1963); MACLACHLAN, Op.
cit. supra note 14, at 375. It is Professor MacLachlan's view that the debtor can not
obtain a discharge from his provable debts once a Chapter XIII plan has been
confirmed.
69 "Skepticism concerning the utility of Chapter XIII is founded upon the fact
that it is a purely voluntary proceeding and does not give the bankrupt as prompt
and extensive relief as he could obtain through a discharge in strict bankruptcy."
MACLACELAN, BANKRUPTCY 374 (1956).
70 The Administrative office has reported to the Committee [on Bankruptcy
Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States] a continuing
use of the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act . . . The Com-
mittee called attention to the value of the procedures under Chapter XIII
as reflected in the amount paid to creditors .... The Administrative office
is continuing to encourage the use of Chapter XIII in appropriate cases.
1961 REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 91.
71 As an exception to General Order 14, General Order 55 allows the referee to
appoint one trustee to handle all Chapter XIII cases.
72 "The trustee will be allowed his actual expenses which usually run about 5%
of the moneys he pays out under the plan. In addition he is allowed a fee not to
exceed 5% of moneys paid out under the plan." COwANS, op. cit. supra note 67, at 92.
See also Sloan, Wage Earners' Plan, 33 REF. J. 5, 6 (1959).
73 There is not unanimous agreement on this point. Compare Walker, Is Chapter
XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Welfare State?, 33 REF. J. 7 (1959) with Allgood,
Chapter XIII-Referee Allgood Replies to Referee Walker, 33 REP. J. 51 (1959).
74 The writer believes this is a valid conclusion to be drawn from the cases dis-
cussed in this comment. Also, as indicated supra at note 69, the judges who will con-
strue the Act have advocated its expanded use. Such a favorable disposition should
result in a liberal construction.
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important, the practicing bar will recommend the plan where it is
proper and helpful to clients. 75 Already this has been the single most
important factor in the emergence of the plan. With more and more
attorneys formally studying bankruptcy, the bar will become better
acquainted with the plan's benefits.
Theodore J. Biagini
75 In California, the Continuing Education of the Bar recently held workshops
on the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. The text written by Referee Cowans, op.
cit. supra note 68, was distributed to the bar under this series. Further, the American
Bar Association has recently published a handbook on Chapter XIII proceedings.
HrhLIARD & HURT, WAGE EARNERS' PLANS UNDER CHAPTER XIII OF THE BANKRUPTCY
AcT (1963).
